“Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.”[1]
Aristotle has acknowledged that nature supplies us with virtues; however, those virtues are not instantaneous but cultivated state of character. Such state of character aims for the intermediate or means, which in turn leads to the ultimate good. Aristotle argues that Virtues are of two kinds, intellectual and moral virtues. The focus here is to look at his view on moral virtues. Moral virtue is a state of character and those states are intermediate actions. They lie between deficiencies and excess. Therefore, moral virtue or a moral virtuous life aims at the intermediate state refusing to be content with defects and excess. Although it is a very hard thing, it is done my habituation or cultivation. In other words, for Aristotle the virtuous life is accomplish by habits or a particular way from our youth, “Hence, we ought to be brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.”[2]
In light of his premise, he makes it clear that those habits are not habituated or fix at old age, but from youth. It seems, therefore, that Aristotle premise favors Solomon’s point in Ecclesiastes, “For what God has made straight cannot be crooked.” In Aristotle’s claim it would be, for what nature has given cannot go contrary to its nature; “For nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature”.[3] Therefore, it is imperative for those habits to be formed from ones youth. Aristotle says, “It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference”.[4]
The question then, is, what makes these state of character or activities of the soul virtuous? It befits Aristotle to suggest that they are determined or known by circumstances and occasions. Therefore, occasions and circumstances make room for measure or rules of virtue. They are two rules by which Aristotle measures actions: rules of pleasure and pain. “And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain”[5]. Furthermore, it is important to note, that, virtues are not easy actions; however, virtues are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Likewise, just and temperate acts are not magical (Abracadabra style), it is a cultivation or action pertaining strictly to the man who possesses these state of character. And these are not theory for Aristotle but practical actions taken by the temperate and just man. Therefore, just and temperate actions are not done or taken by a man who possesses a nature different from a just and temperate man. For Aristotle it is an oxymoron. It is contrary to his nature.
Next, the agent who is taken just and temperate acts must be in a certain condition as he does those actions, he will have to possess three conditions: “First, he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.”[6] In this case, just and temperate action brings to light the state of the agent who does those actions. Meaning, he is knowledgeable of just and temperate acts, he chooses these acts, and his actions proceeds from a firm and unchangeable character. However, it is important that these actions are not magical but a habit form from very young. Hence, in this view we find a balance agent able to differentiate the good from the bad by a state of character cultivated from young.
Consequently, the nature of virtue should also be considered in order to find what it is. They are three kinds of things find in the soul-passions, faculties, states of character; therefore virtue should be one of these. There is a necessity to consider their state of affairs.
“Passions, I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in a general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderate; and similarly with reference to the other passions”.[7]
As stated earlier, Aristotle argues that virtue is a state of character, then, we should consider why passions and faculties are not favorable to be virtue. He lays out a reasonable argument as to why they are not considered to be virtue. First, passions are not because as he says, “We are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions”.[8] Rightly so, President Barack Hussein Obama would not be praise for his passion or joy, but the action he takes to resolve this economic crisis. American citizens are not going around praising Obama for his message of hope, change, and being charismatic, however, for his ability to come up with tangible and not theorical solution for the debt ceiling and unemployment.
Virtue therefore is not considered to be some sort of movement, if it was so, passions would be virtue. However, virtue is a particular unchanging and firm way by which an individual lives his life. A virtuous man would not make a decision to abstain from some form of excess and deficiencies today and tomorrow decide to indulge in it. This man would have a firm state of character yesterday, today, and tomorrow. As a result, virtues are a stable state that does not change even when he is offer a good deal of money to change his choice of being virtuous.
Similarly, they are faculties, “for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature”.[9] Here Aristotle is clear as to what nature does, it supplies us with the faculties or the potential of good or bad, but the activities are what determine virtues. For example, we would not say, Professor Kappleman is a great quarterback when he has not played football in his life. However, we will say, Professor Kappleman has great potential to become a good quarterback but he will have to practice hard for those potential to take form on the football field. Therefore, faculties could not be virtue because it only makes us cognizant of its potential and not its state. If we condition virtue to faculties, it is like saying a new born baby has walked when he has never touched the floor. He may possess the potential to walk, but he is not walking, therefore he cannot walk. In like manner is virtue. Virtue is the walking that provides evidence that the baby has moved from potential to the state of character.
Since virtue is not passions, or faculties, it should be states of character. Then, it begs the inquiry as to why virtue is a state of character; it is a state of a character because the activity the possessor of virtue does is done well and with excellence. The virtue man would not do anything with defects or even with excess, in Aristotle words, “The virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well”.[10] For further consideration, we would not say for sport a particular dog is good because of choosing to say he is good. But certain conditions that describe the dog as good we say he is a good dog. Or for instance, consider love. No one would say they love a person or thing and not give their attention to his object of love i.e. wife, daughter, book, school, and car. On the contrary, he would not go to the extreme of drinking poison or even cut his own throat. It will defeat the choice to possess an intermediate state of character which in this case is love.
Finally, this state of character besides being cultivated it is necessary for it to be a choice proceeds by a rational principle. This principle helps the agent be exact in his actions and decision making, because he possess knowledge of defects and excess, he therefore aims for the intermediate as an archer aims at his target. So, the agent or virtue man aims at the mean fearing to fall in the categories of defect and excess for he would not be living up to his state of character.
[1]Nicomachean Ethics, 952 Book II. Ch.1 1102 25
[2] 954 Book II. Ch.2 1104 10-14
[3]952 Book II. Ch.1 1102 20
[4]953 Book II Ch.1 1103 25
[5] 955 Book II Ch.3 1105 4-5
[6] 956 Book II Ch.4 1104 30
[7] 956 Book II Ch.5 1105 20-25
[8] 956 Book II Ch.5 1105 30
[9] 957 Book II Ch.5 1106 6-9
[10] 957 Book II Ch.6 1106 20-24
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