Efficient Cause of Sensible Things

            In his second argument for the existence of God, St. Thomas Aquinas takes into consideration Efficient Cause to be the cause for things that exist in the sensible world. Thus arguing that things need causes for its existence, therefore there must be an Efficient Cause that could cause things in the sensible world. In presenting this argument to all intelligent observer of the natural world (from things that are made), he draws a striking similarity with Aristotle’s theory of demonstration and there are two methods of demonstration: one is from cause to effect and the other from effect to cause. Though it is obvious here, that, St. Thomas proceeds his argument for Efficient Cause from the basis of effect to cause.

 As one observe, analyze, and consider things that are made, the one observing cannot resort in a world of denial refusing to ask the question what is the cause of something rather than nothing? This question therefore is the reason why Efficient Cause is the most logical argument from St. Thomas five arguments for the existence of God. Because it provides an undeniable truth with respect to the order of efficient cause to the first efficient cause, “In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes.” [1] In addition, it is important to establish the principle by which it will be determine the first efficient cause of all efficient causes. First, what brings efficient causes, what power constitutes efficient causes, what material reason efficient causes are, what purpose, goal, or aim efficient causes moving towards?

After establishing this principle that will serve as guide to ascertain the nature of first efficient cause, the consideration of any possible weakness to this argument will also be taken into account and conclude by providing the strength for this argument; let’s begin developing this argument. The nature of efficient cause in sensible things, propositions for this argument: (i) there is an order of efficient causes (ii) efficient causes cannot be the caused of itself or even prior to itself (iii) efficient causes cannot go into infinite, therefore there is an order “the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause” [2](iiii) efficient causes has no effect without a cause (iiiii) therefore God is the first efficient cause of all efficient causes independent from sensible things for his existence.

There is an order of efficient causes. “In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes” [3] here St. Thomas is shedding light to nakedness of the world as a signal for an efficient cause, not that the signal in itself is the efficient cause but simply bearing witness to the first efficient cause. Imagine driving on Mountain Creek Parkway with the intention to go on freeway 20, but between the freeway and you there is the red stop sign with a message on it “STOP”. Clearly the sign in itself is not the efficient cause; however, it is there as an idea to bring awareness to a reality that is there.  As observed the red stop sign is not the power that caused itself to be there but was a first efficient cause. Likewise, the stop sign had a material cause which is to prevent any potential accident from occurring. Consequently, with this same logic it is important to say that the goal of the stop sign is to point to a reality not seen but still evident.

Efficient causes cannot cause itself or prior to itself. Here it will be good to observe a pregnant woman; prior to her pregnancy the baby could not have requested life since he/she was not there. However, by the parent’s choice the baby is given life. Therefore, life was not dependent on the baby but on the parents. Similarly, efficient causes could not have caused it or prior to itself to be, there is a first efficient cause that caused efficient causes. And this is not done by accident or any chance. The idea that causes existence lies outside the efficient causes to a first efficient cause which in turn depends on nothing else for its existence but itself. Upon this principle the power and material cause overlaps with that of the idea. In the same respect the goal is to underscore the reality of a first efficient cause. “There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible”[4] Therefore, for every effect there must be a cause precedes itself prior to it existence or else there is no first efficient cause, for it is the means to bring something into existence.

Efficient causes cannot go into infinite. For if it goes into infinity it will rule out the possibility of a first efficient cause for efficient causes in the world of sense perception. This therefore contradicts the self-evident rules. The effect of a thing cannot be bigger than the cause of things. It is like saying that a horse has five foot when at the moment you are seeing the horse with four foot walking toward the stable. Seeing and counting four and saying that the horse has five foot instead of the four, is saying basically there is no cause but only effects.

Efficient causes have no effect without a cause. It should suffice to say, that without a cause to an effect there would not be any end goal, purpose, or even meaning to the effect if the cause is subtracted. A house could not exist without a foundation, a car could not drive without an engine, and consequently there could never be a man without a soul or else he will simple reduces to a corpse. In light of this therefore, there could never be efficient causes without a first efficient cause. A corpse cannot will itself in existence unless something powerful wills it into existence. Moreover, there must be an efficient idea that wills the corpse from being a corpse to possess life. Accordingly, there is a necessity for a first efficient cause to have efficient causes in the world of sensible things. From the order of efficient causes in the sensible world, is the foundation from which lies any knowledge possible to obtain from the first efficient cause.

Therefore God is the first efficient cause of all efficient causes independent from sensible things for his existence. But because God implanted his attributes in sensible things knowledge of him is possible to obtain from efficient causes. Although it is important to clarify those efficient causes is not the fullness of knowledge in itself but is like a tour guide to God which is the first efficient cause by which all causes derives from. In short, nothing could cause God, but God himself. Therefore, the distinction that should be deemed is that God (first efficient cause) is infinite and efficient causes are not endless. Efficient causes begin with God and ends in God. For this purpose it should be said, that, God is the actual initiator of everything that exist in the world of senses. Meaning, God always existed and there would not be anything if he had not existed.

 In conclusion, given that the principle use to establish the first efficient cause in order to make sense of existing things rather than nothing, and the cause of existing things in the sensible world, it is imperative then, to proceed in dealing with possible weakness of the second argument for God’s existence. And as stated previously this argument seems to be the most logical of the five propose by St. Thomas because it gives sense, meaning, and purpose to things. The weakness, therefore seems like this argument could lead us into a wall of “probabilities” regard to the first efficient cause; which could potentially lead to skepticism. For example, the famous Big Bang theory could be a strong argument against this principle or second argument and its supporting propositions. For in a world of probabilities anything could happen. Man, could descend from Apes, the Big Bang theory could be the first efficient cause that could be the initiator of efficient causes in the sensible world. In addition, a second objection is that it does not provide a hard core or solid defense for infinite regress; although this second argument logically coheres it also can lead us into a world of despair and nihilism and a series of multiplicity of events that could result into efficient cause.

Strength, although the possibility exist for the multiplicity of efficient causes in the sensible world, however, there is but the first efficient cause for the sensible world. On the other hand, it provides knowledge to the first efficient cause from which the intricate structure of efficient causes in the sensible world proceeds from. It also gives credence to an always existing being non dependent on anything for his existence. Therefore he is call God.

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[1] Aquinas n.d. Q.2. Art.3

[2] Q.2.ART.3

[3] Q.2.ART.3

[4] Q.2.ART.3

"Real World"

I have often heard the expression, "The Real World." What do we really mean by this expression? Or what is the implication of this expression? In light of this statement, i have a humble question to ask. Is it not "real" to live a life absent of technology, politics, science, computers, and things that we use to describe what is real or isn't? Why is "real" consist of business, economy, finance, and not "real" to live a contemplative life. It's a dichotomy that has been set in place to dishearten the individual who desires to live a life absent from these categories that are used in the "real world." If such person decides to follow this path, culture labels the individual as a "Nomad" or "Desert Man". Therefore, if i have the opportunity to mentor someone, my advice for that individual would be to beware of the "real world." This giant that has taken a throne in our culture, invites us all to bow down to his knee or else we will be an outcast from the "real world."

Limits of Science, Math, and Technology

In recent years since the scientific revolution, our epistemology and ways of deducting our perceptions or reasons for doing metaphysics has radically shifted. Now, we are experiencing an increase in "Futurist" epistemology of life. Meaning, technology has and is becoming the surest principle from which we can draw truths or truism. In light of this, all of our modern accomplishments has become the preface on which science, math, and technology can glory or justify its military advancement in our culture. However, its limits are obvious or else we have chosen to be oblivious of it. Humanity is in jeopardy regarding its communal life-style, its ability to research independently from any accelerated aid (tech), its human emotional experience, and its ability to solve problems are now dependent on our ability to maneuver technological advances. In recent political deliberations, politicians are calling for a president who would be able to calculate and solve problems from this premise. Also, in recent event a French airline was destroyed because its captain could not handle the technological nuance before him. Or following president Obama's argument on global competition: "to compete with the world we have to buckle up and teach our kids science, math, and technology". Science, math, and technology are not evil or monsters. However, culturally, politically, and economically we have to acknowledge it's limits. In conclusion, math and scientific calculation gives us knowledge to the function of things, but fall short of providing us with the nature of things. Scientific and technological epistemology therefore, are becoming substitution for human self-knowledge stealing our humanity.

Knowledge of His Will (Colossians 1:9-14)

Reading St. Paul's letter to a church he has not seen but only heard of their conversion to the Kingdom of God, he speedily wrote a prayer of encouragement to the church for them to endure the severe ideological attack they were going through by a group of people that had a philosophical view that were perverting the true meaning of the Gospel. The Saint therefore, laying out the structure of his prayer used a word as his thesis that was used also by those philosophers who contradicts the Gospel. The word he used is, "KNOWLEDGE". He said, i pray for you and asking God to fill you with the KNOWLEDGE of his will. What is knowledge? Why do the Saint wanted the church to be fill with the knowledge of God's will? Can knowledge supply us with an understanding of God's will? Moving forward, it's essential to define the word knowledge. The Webster dictionary provides two interesting definition of this word. First, knowledge is information, understanding, or skill that you get from experience or education. Second, knowledge is awareness of something: the state of being aware of something. 

Therefore, base upon these definition we have an idea of the Saint goal in his prayer for the church, which could be for them to be aware of what really the Father had done on their behalf through the Lord Jesus Christ. As the Saint said, "Giving thanks to the Father, who has qualified you to share in the inheritance of the saints in the kingdom of God. For he has rescued us from the dominion of darkness and brought us into the kingdom of the Son he loves. In whom we have redemption, the forgiveness of sins." The Saint knew that knowledge and not a special knowledge was fundamental to grasped this truth of the Father's will. In essence the Father's will is for them to take hold of what he has done for them. For this reason, the Saint wanted the church not to have knowledge as some special or a mystical accent, however, he wanted them "to be fill of the knowledge of God's will in order to live a life worthy of the Lord and may please him in every way: bearing fruit in every good work, being strengthened with all power according to his glorious might so that you may have great endurance and patience, and joyfully giving thanks to the father".

Rene Descartes

Rene Descartes 1596-1650

‘Cogito ergo sum’ (I am thinking, therefore I exist)

French philosopher, born near Tours, he was educated at the *Jesuit college at La Fleche and at the University of Poitiers. As a young man he travelled widely and in 1619, after a day’s meditation in a stove-heated room in Bavaria, became convinced that he was destined to found a new philosophical system. Furthermore, it has been said that Rene Descartes is the father of modern philosophy; with his contribution to the scientific revolution in the 17^th century. Where he argued for the elimination of real qualities from physics in favor of explanations involving only the divisions, shapes, and motions of matters; in philosophical terms: a radical move from the medieval Metaphysics to epistemology.

            Therefore, the rational foundation is the epicenter of modern philosophy from the beginning of the 17^th  century. It is imperative to note here, that the natural law ideology that set ablaze countless revolution in the 17^th century were directly influence by Descartes’ reasoning of ‘Real Qualities’ proposition. The premise natural law draws its strength from was the idea that if any knowledge is possible it can be deducted by mathematics and discover by science.  Robert M. Martin define natural law as, “A natural law can be a formulation of a regularity found in the natural world, the sort of thing science discovers.” (Martin)

Consequently, it can be argued that many philosophical and scientific discoveries in the modern world can be attributed to Descartes methods from which he search tiressly to find the edge or certainty to eliminate his doubts about things and how they can be grasps. Nevertheless, he thought for such discovery to be possible he will have to reconstruct knowledge on the basis of mathematics; he was attracted by the certainty and clarity of this discipline. In addition to extend his methods to the whole of human knowledge, “To this end he devised his method of doubt, rejecting everything in which one can imagine the least doubt, so as to arrive at an unshakeable foundation for philosophy” (Cross and Livingstone).

The precision he found in mathematics and for the provision to any type of knowledge is formidable. On the other hand, very much controversial because it makes room for skepticism and challenge to authority; it will not be surprising that he on several occasions had problem with the church institution of his day. He argues, “For whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two and three make five. Here Descartes seems to imply that we cannot dream that two and three are four, though he does not explicitly say so” (Clark). Therefore, here it seems that mathematics; escape this skeptical criticism, for its certainty and clarity to make knowledge of natural laws or internal things possible. Finally, “He also proceeds from this premise to established the existence first of God and then of the external world whose nature we can understand provided we restrict ourselves to the (God-given) ‘clear and distinct perceptions’ of the intellect” (Cross and Livingstone).

 

Bibliography

Clark, Gordon H. Thales to Dewey. Ed. Elizaneth Clark George Louis A. Zeller. Second Edition. Jefferson: The Trinity Foundatio, 1989.

Cross and Livingstone. "The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church." The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. Ed. E.A. Livingstone. 3rd . New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 447.

Martin, Robert M. "The Philosopher's Disctionary." Martin, Robert M. The Philosopher's Dictionary. Thrid Edition. Mississauga: Broadview Press, 2002. 206-207.

      

             

Aristotle Moral Virtue

“Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.”[1]

            Aristotle has acknowledged that nature supplies us with virtues; however, those virtues are not instantaneous but cultivated state of character. Such state of character aims for the intermediate or means, which in turn leads to the ultimate good. Aristotle argues that Virtues are of two kinds, intellectual and moral virtues. The focus here is to look at his view on moral virtues. Moral virtue is a state of character and those states are intermediate actions. They lie between deficiencies and excess. Therefore, moral virtue or a moral virtuous life aims at the intermediate state refusing to be content with defects and excess. Although it is a very hard thing, it is done my habituation or cultivation. In other words, for Aristotle the virtuous life is accomplish by habits or a particular way from our youth, “Hence, we ought to be brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.”[2]

            In light of his premise, he makes it clear that those habits are not habituated or fix at old age, but from youth. It seems, therefore, that Aristotle premise favors Solomon’s point in Ecclesiastes, “For what God has made straight cannot be crooked.” In Aristotle’s claim it would be, for what nature has given cannot go contrary to its nature; “For nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature”.[3] Therefore, it is imperative for those habits to be formed from ones youth. Aristotle says, “It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference”.[4]   

            The question then, is, what makes these state of character or activities of the soul virtuous? It befits Aristotle to suggest that they are determined or known by circumstances and occasions. Therefore, occasions and circumstances make room for measure or rules of virtue. They are two rules by which Aristotle measures actions: rules of pleasure and pain. “And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain”[5]. Furthermore, it is important to note, that, virtues are not easy actions; however, virtues are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Likewise, just and temperate acts are not magical (Abracadabra style), it is a cultivation or action pertaining strictly to the man who possesses these state of character. And these are not theory for Aristotle but practical actions taken by the temperate and just man. Therefore, just and temperate actions are not done or taken by a man who possesses a nature different from a just and temperate man. For Aristotle it is an oxymoron. It is contrary to his nature.

            Next, the agent who is taken just and temperate acts must be in a certain condition as he does those actions, he will have to possess three conditions: “First, he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.”[6] In this case, just and temperate action brings to light the state of the agent who does those actions. Meaning, he is knowledgeable of just and temperate acts, he chooses these acts, and his actions proceeds from a firm and unchangeable character. However, it is important that these actions are not magical but a habit form from very young. Hence, in this view we find a balance agent able to differentiate the good from the bad by a state of character cultivated from young.

            Consequently, the nature of virtue should also be considered in order to find what it is. They are three kinds of things find in the soul-passions, faculties, states of character; therefore virtue should be one of these. There is a necessity to consider their state of affairs.

“Passions, I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in a general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderate; and similarly with reference to the other passions”.[7]

As stated earlier, Aristotle argues that virtue is a state of character, then, we should consider why passions and faculties are not favorable to be virtue. He lays out a reasonable argument as to why they are not considered to be virtue. First, passions are not because as he says, “We are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions”.[8] Rightly so, President Barack Hussein Obama would not be praise for his passion or joy, but the action he takes to resolve this economic crisis. American citizens are not going around praising Obama for his message of hope, change, and being charismatic, however, for his ability to come up with tangible and not theorical solution for the debt ceiling and unemployment.

Virtue therefore is not considered to be some sort of movement, if it was so, passions would be virtue. However, virtue is a particular unchanging and firm way by which an individual lives his life. A virtuous man would not make a decision to abstain from some form of excess and deficiencies today and tomorrow decide to indulge in it. This man would have a firm state of character yesterday, today, and tomorrow. As a result, virtues are a stable state that does not change even when he is offer a good deal of money to change his choice of being virtuous.

Similarly, they are faculties, “for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature”.[9] Here Aristotle is clear as to what nature does, it supplies us with the faculties or the potential of good or bad, but the activities are what determine virtues. For example, we would not say, Professor Kappleman is a great quarterback when he has not played football in his life. However, we will say, Professor Kappleman has great potential to become a good quarterback but he will have to practice hard for those potential to take form on the football field. Therefore, faculties could not be virtue because it only makes us cognizant of its potential and not its state. If we condition virtue to faculties, it is like saying a new born baby has walked when he has never touched the floor. He may possess the potential to walk, but he is not walking, therefore he cannot walk. In like manner is virtue. Virtue is the walking that provides evidence that the baby has moved from potential to the state of character.

Since virtue is not passions, or faculties, it should be states of character. Then, it begs the inquiry as to why virtue is a state of character; it is a state of a character because the activity the possessor of virtue does is done well and with excellence. The virtue man would not do anything with defects or even with excess, in Aristotle words, “The virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well”.[10] For further consideration, we would not say for sport a particular dog is good because of choosing to say he is good. But certain conditions that describe the dog as good we say he is a good dog. Or for instance, consider love. No one would say they love a person or thing and not give their attention to his object of love i.e. wife, daughter, book, school, and car. On the contrary, he would not go to the extreme of drinking poison or even cut his own throat. It will defeat the choice to possess an intermediate state of character which in this case is love.

Finally, this state of character besides being cultivated it is necessary for it to be a choice proceeds by a rational principle. This principle helps the agent be exact in his actions and decision making, because he possess knowledge of defects and excess, he therefore aims for the intermediate as an archer aims at his target. So, the agent or virtue man aims at the mean fearing to fall in the categories of defect and excess for he would not be living up to his state of character.   

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[1]Nicomachean Ethics, 952 Book II. Ch.1 1102 25

[2] 954 Book II. Ch.2 1104 10-14

[3]952 Book II. Ch.1 1102 20

[4]953 Book II Ch.1 1103 25

[5] 955 Book II Ch.3 1105 4-5

[6] 956 Book II Ch.4 1104 30

[7] 956 Book II Ch.5 1105 20-25

[8] 956 Book II Ch.5 1105 30

[9] 957 Book II Ch.5 1106 6-9

[10] 957 Book II Ch.6 1106 20-24

Aristotle Moral Virtue

“Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.”[1]

            Aristotle has acknowledged that nature supplies us with virtues; however, those virtues are not instantaneous but cultivated state of character. Such state of character aims for the intermediate or means, which in turn leads to the ultimate good. Aristotle argues that Virtues are of two kinds, intellectual and moral virtues. The focus here is to look at his view on moral virtues. Moral virtue is a state of character and those states are intermediate actions. They lie between deficiencies and excess. Therefore, moral virtue or a moral virtuous life aims at the intermediate state refusing to be content with defects and excess. Although it is a very hard thing, it is done my habituation or cultivation. In other words, for Aristotle the virtuous life is accomplish by habits or a particular way from our youth, “Hence, we ought to be brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.”[2]

            In light of his premise, he makes it clear that those habits are not habituated or fix at old age, but from youth. It seems, therefore, that Aristotle premise favors Solomon’s point in Ecclesiastes, “For what God has made straight cannot be crooked.” In Aristotle’s claim it would be, for what nature has given cannot go contrary to its nature; “For nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature”.[3] Therefore, it is imperative for those habits to be formed from ones youth. Aristotle says, “It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference”.[4]   

            The question then, is, what makes these state of character or activities of the soul virtuous? It befits Aristotle to suggest that they are determined or known by circumstances and occasions. Therefore, occasions and circumstances make room for measure or rules of virtue. They are two rules by which Aristotle measures actions: rules of pleasure and pain. “And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain”[5]. Furthermore, it is important to note, that, virtues are not easy actions; however, virtues are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Likewise, just and temperate acts are not magical (Abracadabra style), it is a cultivation or action pertaining strictly to the man who possesses these state of character. And these are not theory for Aristotle but practical actions taken by the temperate and just man. Therefore, just and temperate actions are not done or taken by a man who possesses a nature different from a just and temperate man. For Aristotle it is an oxymoron. It is contrary to his nature.

            Next, the agent who is taken just and temperate acts must be in a certain condition as he does those actions, he will have to possess three conditions: “First, he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.”[6] In this case, just and temperate action brings to light the state of the agent who does those actions. Meaning, he is knowledgeable of just and temperate acts, he chooses these acts, and his actions proceeds from a firm and unchangeable character. However, it is important that these actions are not magical but a habit form from very young. Hence, in this view we find a balance agent able to differentiate the good from the bad by a state of character cultivated from young.

            Consequently, the nature of virtue should also be considered in order to find what it is. They are three kinds of things find in the soul-passions, faculties, states of character; therefore virtue should be one of these. There is a necessity to consider their state of affairs.

“Passions, I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in a general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderate; and similarly with reference to the other passions”.[7]

As stated earlier, Aristotle argues that virtue is a state of character, then, we should consider why passions and faculties are not favorable to be virtue. He lays out a reasonable argument as to why they are not considered to be virtue. First, passions are not because as he says, “We are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions”.[8] Rightly so, President Barack Hussein Obama would not be praise for his passion or joy, but the action he takes to resolve this economic crisis. American citizens are not going around praising Obama for his message of hope, change, and being charismatic, however, for his ability to come up with tangible and not theorical solution for the debt ceiling and unemployment.

Virtue therefore is not considered to be some sort of movement, if it was so, passions would be virtue. However, virtue is a particular unchanging and firm way by which an individual lives his life. A virtuous man would not make a decision to abstain from some form of excess and deficiencies today and tomorrow decide to indulge in it. This man would have a firm state of character yesterday, today, and tomorrow. As a result, virtues are a stable state that does not change even when he is offer a good deal of money to change his choice of being virtuous.

Similarly, they are faculties, “for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature”.[9] Here Aristotle is clear as to what nature does, it supplies us with the faculties or the potential of good or bad, but the activities are what determine virtues. For example, we would not say, Professor Kappleman is a great quarterback when he has not played football in his life. However, we will say, Professor Kappleman has great potential to become a good quarterback but he will have to practice hard for those potential to take form on the football field. Therefore, faculties could not be virtue because it only makes us cognizant of its potential and not its state. If we condition virtue to faculties, it is like saying a new born baby has walked when he has never touched the floor. He may possess the potential to walk, but he is not walking, therefore he cannot walk. In like manner is virtue. Virtue is the walking that provides evidence that the baby has moved from potential to the state of character.

Since virtue is not passions, or faculties, it should be states of character. Then, it begs the inquiry as to why virtue is a state of character; it is a state of a character because the activity the possessor of virtue does is done well and with excellence. The virtue man would not do anything with defects or even with excess, in Aristotle words, “The virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well”.[10] For further consideration, we would not say for sport a particular dog is good because of choosing to say he is good. But certain conditions that describe the dog as good we say he is a good dog. Or for instance, consider love. No one would say they love a person or thing and not give their attention to his object of love i.e. wife, daughter, book, school, and car. On the contrary, he would not go to the extreme of drinking poison or even cut his own throat. It will defeat the choice to possess an intermediate state of character which in this case is love.

Finally, this state of character besides being cultivated it is necessary for it to be a choice proceeds by a rational principle. This principle helps the agent be exact in his actions and decision making, because he possess knowledge of defects and excess, he therefore aims for the intermediate as an archer aims at his target. So, the agent or virtue man aims at the mean fearing to fall in the categories of defect and excess for he would not be living up to his state of character.   

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[1]Nicomachean Ethics, 952 Book II. Ch.1 1102 25

[2] 954 Book II. Ch.2 1104 10-14

[3]952 Book II. Ch.1 1102 20

[4]953 Book II Ch.1 1103 25

[5] 955 Book II Ch.3 1105 4-5

[6] 956 Book II Ch.4 1104 30

[7] 956 Book II Ch.5 1105 20-25

[8] 956 Book II Ch.5 1105 30

[9] 957 Book II Ch.5 1106 6-9

[10] 957 Book II Ch.6 1106 20-24